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EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE
Dennis Wendt, Jr.

MOVEMENTS IN PSYCHOLOGY:
EMPIRICALLY SUPPORTED TREATMENTS,
COMMON FACTORS, AND OBJECTIVE
METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM
The empirically supported treatment and common-factors rnovements each offera.framework for evidence-basedpractice. Howeve,; neither.framework is sufficiently objective or
inclusive; rather, they are based 011 unexamined conceptions ofevidmce that commitpreinvestigatory biases against certain types ofmethods andpractices. An EST.framework is
built upon unexamined medical-model asmmptions ofevidence tluzt tlre biased toward
specific treatments based011 randomized controlled (or clinical) trials (RCTs}; thus, itfails
to consider viable non-mediCtll-modefresearch methods and types ofpractice. Arz,tfogousfy,
the common-factors movement, which has influenced a recent American Psychologiatl
Association (APA) poliq on evidence-based practice, is built upo11 u11examined
empiricist assumptions ofevidence that are biased toward sensory observable criteria of
evidence; thus, it fails to consider non-empirical methods and practices (e.g., qualitative research). A third framework, objective methodological pluralism (OMP), avoids
the biases ofthe Jim two frameworks and is better suited for providing the objectivity
and diversity neededfor evidence-based practice.

E vidence-based practice is arguably che most
...onsequenrial and controversial movem ent in
,·chology today (Norcross, Beucler, & Levant,
_ 05) . Although everyone agrees chat practice
s.~ould be informed by evidence (Westen &
Br1dley, 2005; Norcross et al., 2005), there is much
di.,agreemenr about what qualifies as evidence (e.g.,
Reed. 2005; Kihlstrom, 2005; Messer, 2005) and
hether certain evidence-based protocols extend to
ri 11-world practice (e.g., Westen, 2005a; Stirman
• DeRubeis, 2005). This conflict is not a simple
d1spure to be resolved in the laborarory-ic is a
~culture war" between different worldviews in
chc quest for truth, respeccabiliry, and economic
iusion (Norcross et al., 2005, pp. 7-8).
Considering its controversial and consequential
ure, rhe evidence-based "war'' carries both
fi mises and pitfalls. On the one hand, such

evidence-based considerations remind researchers
and practitioners of the need to be accounrable for
their research methods and types of practices. This
reminder ought co be refreshing, considering psychotherapy's history of unexamined and uninvestigaced
methods and theories (Slife, Wiggins, & Graham,
2005). As scientific researchers and practitioners,
we ought to be open to the critical examination of
all types of methods and practices, however prized
or popular they may be. Moreover, a commitment
to critical examination hinders psychology from becoming a relativistic discipline where anything goes
(Slife, Wiggins, & Graham).
On the ocher hand, pressure for evidential basis
could potentially lead to an evidence-based framework that uncritically rests upon a limited concep tion
of evidence. Considering the intense disagreemenc
in psychology about what qualifies as evidence, it

code. D. Jr. (2006). faidencc-ba.,cd practice moYemcncs in psychology: Empiricallycrcatemencs,
,upported
ohjeccive mccho<lological pluralism. !11t11ition: BYU Undergmduare joumnl ofPsyc/,ology, 2. ti9-62.
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is plausible rhac an evidence-based framework
could be biased coward the most popular, powerful, or lucrative conception. This preliminary bias
might hinder an examination of the conception
itself, such as its philosophical assumptions and
whether its methods are best suited for the needs
of actual practice. Worse, it would likely subordinate or disenfranchise alrernacive conceptions
of evidence and the methods and practices they
imply-because such do nor conform to the criteria of the chosen framework, rhey would be ruled
out before an investigarion even begins. For these
reasons, a framework for evidence-based practice
muse itself be validated on scientific grounds and
should be wary about committing co an overly
narrow conception of evidence.
The challenge for psychology, then, is to
articulate an evidence-based framework that is
both inclusive and objecrive. It should be sufficiently open and flexible co include the utilization
and creation of all necessary research methods and
types of practice. At the same rime, its desire for
inclusion cannot slip into an anything-goes relativism- a commitment co evidential basis requires
objective examination of research methods and
practices, according co scientific standards.
Unforrunacely, such a framework does not
currently operate in psychology. Alrhough cwo
prominent evidence-based movements have
emerged in the past decade, neither allows for a
framework that is genuinely objective and inclusive. This article discusses borh movements- the
empirically supported treatment (EST) movement
and the common-factors movement-contending
that neither provides a framework chat achieves
both objectivity and diversity. To che contrary, each
is based on an unexamined conception of evidence
chat commits a preinvestigacory bias against certain
types of methods and practices-that is, certain
methods and practices are ruled out before an
examination even begins. Afrer introducing each
framework and briefly demonstrating cach's respecrive limitations, I will contend that a rhird framework-objective methodological pluralism-is
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better suited at offering an objective and inclusive
framework for evidence-based practice. 1

Empirically Supported Treatment (EST)
Movement
The empirically supported treatment movement
(EST) defines evidence-based practice as the application ofspecific, often manualized, treatments chat
comply with stringent standards of experimental
verification (Butcher, Mineka, & Hooley, 2004:
Norcross et al., 2005; Safran, 2001). Generally.
these treatments are tested according to their efficacy in treating specific psychological disorders, as
identified in the Dit1gnostic and Statistical Manual
ofMental Disorders (DSM; Westen, 20056).
The EST movement sprang from increasing
pressure to justify psychological practices with
evidence. Although psychology has always been
concerned with evidence-based practice (Norcross
et al., 2005), recent years have brought increasing
pressure for keeping pace with medical treatments
such as prescription drugs (APA, 2006). In an age
of increasing anxiety for the justification of health
care practices (Norcross et al.), psychological treatment has developed a reputation-however unjustified-of being less reliable and substantiated
chan medical treatment (APA; Westen & Bradley,
2005).
In an effort to remedy psychology's secondclass citizenship, a succession of cask forces wirhin
Division 12 (Clinical Psychology) of the American
Psychological Association (APA) sought co bolster
the scientific validity of specific psychological
treatments (APA, 2006). Beginning in 1993, the
1. For more extensive information, see \Xlcndt, D. C. (2006).
Evidence-based practice movemems in psychology:
Empirically supporred treatments, common factors, and
methodological pluralism. [Honors thesis.] Available ar
BYU's Harold B. Lee Library and Department of Psychology
(1001 SWKT).
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division "constructed and elaborated a list ofempirically supported, manulized psychological interventions for specific disorders" (Norcross et al., 2005).
Empirical support for these interventionscommonly referred to as empirically supported
creacments (ESTs)- is demonstrated through rigorous laboratory testing of a large random sample,
in which each participant is randomly assigned to
an experimental group (treatment) or a control
group (no treatment, or "waic-lisc"). By controlling
for all variables ocher than the treatment in question-through random assignment and manualized protocols- it is thought chat successful treatments can be experimencally isolated and identified
(Butcher et al., 2004).
This experimental method is called a randomized
clinical (or controlled) trial (RCT), widely esteemed
as the gold standard of research evidence in medicine (Norcross et al., 2005; Safran, 2001). The
RCT's prevalent use in medicine is not surprising,
considering chat che RCT is tailored to fit traditional
medicine's theory of disease and treatment: disease
is the presence of one or more specific symptoms,
and treatment is a specific, uniform procedure for
alleviating such symptoms (Bohart, O 'Hara, &
Leitner, 1998). RCTs are especially esteemed for
determining prescription drug efficacy, in which
an experimental group is given the treatment drug
and a control group is given a placebo. If symptomalleviation is significantly higher in the experimental
group than in the placebo group, then it is thought
co be the treatment-not the patient, the doctor, a
placebo effect or happy chance- that is responsible
for the change. Third-party payment providers can
then trust the treatment to be universally effective
and subsequently offer coverage for such.
Reportedly, Division l 2's intention was merely
to establish chat psychological treatments can be as
or more effective than medical treatments, not necessarily to produce a monopolistic list of acceptable
treatments (APA, 2006). Nonetheless, the division's
project sparked considerable interest in researching
and implementing specific treatments, with the
hope, in some circles, that psychological practice
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could be grounded upon a framework consisting
solely of ESTs (APA). In fact, some professionals
in psychology began contending chat "empirically
supported treatments are all the profession should
allow patients rn choose" (Bohart, 2003, p. 1),
and many payment providers and funding agencies began limiting funding for certain disorders to
ESTs (APA; Norcross et al., 2005; Safran, 2001).
As a result, the EST movement has become so
entrenched in psychology that "evidence-based practice" has grown, in some circles, to be synonymous
with "empirically supported treatments" (Westen &
Bradley, 2005, p. 266). With chis equation in place,
ESTs and RCTs are not seen as a way to justify
psychological mechods and practices, but the way.
By conforming to the strict criteria required by
RCT~, an EST framework succeeds at establishing
a certain level of reliability and credibility. It ultimately fails, however, to be an objective and inclusive framework for evidence-based practice because
it is uncritically biased coward a medical-model of
treatment that is inconsistent with the needs
of many real-world patients and circumstances
(Westen & Bradley, 2005; Messer, 2004; Bohart
et al., 1998). By being committed, a priori, to a
medical-model of treatment, an EST framework
(a) demands, without rationale, chat real-world
practice be reshaped to fir the logic of the RCT and
(b) rejects alternative conceptions of evidence
and the methods and practices they imply, not because of their potential fruitfulness, but merely
because they do not conform to RCT criteria. This
section will address these two factors in turn.

Shaping Practice to Fit RCT Criteria
By assuming that RCTs are the only appropriate
method for evidence-based practice, an EST framework demands that clinical practice be shaped to fir
methodological demands, as opposed to the ocher
way around. In ocher words, an EST-framework is
driven by method, regardless of the real-world situation. This is important, considering the fact that
ESTs lack external validity to the majority of realworld patients and situations (Westen & Bradley,
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2005; Bohart, 2003). Unlike the real world, RCT
pariencs arc limited to those whose sympcoms are
texcbook cases of a single DSM disorder-chus,
their results "may apply only co a narrow and
homogeneous group of patients" (Buecher et al.,
2004, p. 563).
From a mainstream experimental standpoint,
the exclusive use of RCTs is understandable-one
must eliminate confounding variables such as the
presence of ocher disorders-bur from a clinical
perspective, the majoriry of real-world patients
cannoc be pigeonholed into a single diagnostic
cacegory. In face, the majority of U.S. patients arc
comorbid (Morrison, Bradley, & Westen, 2003;
Westen & Bradley, 2005), meaning they are diagnosed wich two or more DSM disorders (Buecher ec
al., 2004). According co che National Comorbidiry
Survey (NCS), 56% of patients have had chree or
more disorders (Buecher cc al.).
In response co this question of external
validiry, advocates for an EST framework insist,
without evidence, char practice can be shaped
for comorbid patients in a way that is consistent
with RCT methodology (Morrison ec al., 2003;
Bohart, 2003). To make this claim, an EST
framework cakes its cues from medicine's common praccice of prescribing multiple drugs:
che answer lies in treating each disorder on an
individual basis. Just as a patient wich multiple
medical problems can cake multiple kinds of
prescripcion drugs, so can a patient with comorbid
mental health disorders receive multiple treatments. A person who is diagnosed with both
depression and anxiety, for example, would receive
rwo manualized ESTs, one for each disorder
(Morrison et al., 2003).
Ar face value chis practice may seem plausible,
but ir rests upon a problematic assumption of
the medical-model, at lease as far as it relates to
psychology. This assumption is the t1tomistic assumption ofcomorbidity (my term), in which disease can
be operacionalized as one or more self-contained
disorders. This allows for comorbid disorders co be
underscood, diagnosed, and rreaced on an individual
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basis. In ocher words, comorbid patients can be
created as if they have only one disorder (Morrison
er al., 2003). Thus, one parienc's combinacion o~
depression and anxiety is nor considered to be a
qualitatively unique whole, but merely the quantitative sum of rwo self-concained pares (Morrison
et al.). With chis assumption, researchers and practitioners can presume char a single disorder for a
comorbid pacicnt manifests itself in the same wa)·
as ir would for a noncomorbid pacienc-rhus, both
pariencs can be created with the same RCT-verified,
manualized treatment (Morrison et al.).
The acomistic assumpcion is method-driYen
because it forces real-world praccice (creating a
comorbid patient) co fit the logic of the medicalmodel (via the atomistic assumption), wirhouc
considering whether rhis requirement is justified
by evidence. If the atomistic assumption were to be
evaluated, it would need to be from a wider conception of evidence than mere RCTs: because RCTs
do not include comorbid pariencs, their results
alone do not determine whether ESTs are appropriate for comorbid paciencs. Thus, critics of an EST
framework have appealed co a broader framework
of evidence-one char can more aptly inform how
RCTs relate co actual practice-co shO\v che problems of the atomistic assumption. This framework
includes empirical research chat suggests char
ESTs have limited success for comorbid patients
(Morrison et al., 2003; Messer, 2004).
The revelation of che atomiscic assumption of
comorbidicy is just one way char critics have exposed
che external validity limitations of an EST framework. Considerable research has demonstrated, for
example, rhar manualized ESTs ofren hinder the
presence of important therapeutic faccors, such as
che therapisc's genuineness, creativiry, and mocivation, as well as rhe paticnc's faith in the cherapisc
and the strength of the therapeutic relationship
(Piper & Ogrodniczuk, 1999). Ocher research has
shown char success rares of che RCT are inflated
due co its disregard of long-term relapse races and
its exclusion of early dropouts before determining
efficacy rates (Messer, 2004).
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The preceding research casts doubt on the
objectivity of an EST-framework, suggesting that
such is based on an inherently limited and biased
conception of evidence, as opposed to an infallible
window to reality. This could be known, however,
only by relying upon a conception of evidence that
includes, but is not limited to, che RCT.

Rejecting Alternative Conceptions ofEvidence
In connection with reshaping real-world practice
co match the criteria ofa medical-model ofevidence,
an EST framework fails to consider alternative
conceptions of evidence and the methods and practices they imply, not because of their potential fruitfulness, but merely because they do not conform to
the medical model's presumptions of disorder, treatment, and human change. Such types of practice
include, but are not limited co, humanistic therapies
di enc-centered, existential, experiential, gestalt),
psychodynamic therapies (Freudian psychoanalysis,
mterpersonal, self psychology, object relations), and
certain marital/family therapies (family systems,
structural family; Butcher ct al., 2004). Although
these therapies are considerably different, they are
similar in that they are not concerned, or solely
concerned, with treating specific disorders using
manualizcd treatments.
From the perspective of these ocher therapies,
evidence-based practice would be significanrly broader chan a medical-model approach.
Humanistic therapies, for example, are concerned
with nondiagnoscic issues, such as expanding a
patient's "awareness" and dealing with problems
of "alienation, depersonalization, loneliness, and
a failure to find meaning and genuine fulfillment" (Butcher et al., 2004, p. 584). A key
component of humanistic research and practice
is the relationship between the therapist and the
patient. As mentioned above, a reliance on manu.ilized treatments impedes che development of
a therapeutic relationship, which is essential for
humanistic therapies. To cultivate a therapeutic
relationship, therapists muse remain free to incorporate their own clinical wisdom, according to the
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specific patient and context. Because of the uniqueness of each pacienc and therapy session, good
practitioners do not robotically apply seep-by-step
protocols, but instead "are artists who learn how to
apply [empirically supported] principles in creative
ways" (Beucler, as qtd. in Bohart, 2003, p. 4).
In contrast, a medical-model approach puts an
emphasis on universal, "packaged" treatments for
well-defined, compartmentalized disorders (Bohart
et al., 1998). As mentioned earlier, chis model cakes
its cues from medicine's study of pharmaceutics,
where "one must specify the treatment and make
sure it is being applied correctly" (Bohart et al.,
p. 143). Just as a drug prescription is a specific, portable package in terms of its encapsulated ingredients and usage directions, so muse a psychological
treatment be "packaged" as an instruction manual
with specific procedures and directions. In both
cases, every patient receives the exact same thing,
and it is this thing that is the agent of change-the
health professional is merely a delivery person, and
the patient, a passive recipient.
As long as an EST framework is built upon the
assumption that packaged treatments-not therapists or patients-are responsible for change, its
research agenda will commit a preinvestigarory bias
against humanistic and ocher therapies; such therapies would be ruled our before investigation even
begins. The disenfranchisement of these therapies
would be troubling for many, if not most, psychotherapists, considering the discipline's widespread
eclecticism and integrarionism (Slife & Reber,
2001).

Common-factors Movement
Because of the biases and exclusiveness of
an EST framework, many researchers and practitioners have vehemently opposed restricting
evidence-based practice to ESTs (e.g., Bohart,
2003; Greenberg & \X'atson, 2005; Messer, 2004;
Morrison et al., 2003; Westen & Bradley, 2005).
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Common-factors advocates 2 have argued thar a
focus on specific treatments for specific disorders
is only one way of conceptualizing psychological
practice (e.g., Bohart, 2003; Westen & Bradley,
2005; Messer, 2004; Safran, 2001). An alternative approach is to discover and validate factors of
therapeutic change chat are common across treatments. These "common factors" include therapist
techniques and characteristics such as empathy
(Bohart et al., 1998), patient characteristics such
as "active self-healing abilities" (Bohart, 2005,
p. 218), and the relationship between therapist and
patient (Norcross & Lambert, 2005; APA, 2006).
An attention to common factors is based on a
different worldview than an EST framework, in
which responsibility for change is not attributed to
a specific treatment alone, bur also to the therapist,
the patient, and their dynamic relationship (APA,
2006). Psychotherapy researchers have claimed to
measure and empirically validate common factors,
and argue that the presence of these factors is often
a more successful determinant of change chan is
mere adherence co ESTs (Norcross ec al., 2005).
Thus, from this view, the answer for evidencebased practice is to discover and apply common
factors within all types of therapy, not impose a
one-size-fies-all strategy (Bohart, 2003; Westen &
Bradley, 2005).
A common-factors approach is appealing,
considering that the majority of practitioners consider themselves eclectics and incegracionists who
value a wide array of research methods, therapeutic techniques, and theoretical orientations
(Slife & Reber, 2001). Eclectic and integrationist
practitioners believe chat openness to a pluralism

2. T hese advocates represent a pluralism of views, each with
a variety of nuances (Messer, 2004), but they are sim ilar
in their concern about an EST-framework's "emphasis on
specific creatmem effects as opposed to common factors
that account for much of che variance in outcomes across
disorders" (APA, 2006, p. 272). Due co chis similarity, I
have conceptualized chis group as representing a single
movement-the common-factors movement.
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of methods, including ESTs, allows them to bercer
help the wide range of patients and problems they
encounter (Slife & Reber).
Because of its wide appeal, the common-faccors
movement has made a considerable impact in
recent years. Most recently, the common-factors
movement has played a significant role in shaping APA's new policy on evidence-based practice
in psychology (EBPP). The policy's supplementary report, authored by the APA Presidential Task
Force on Evidence-Based Practice (2006), makes
it clear chat a comprehensive strategy for EBPP
"will consider [many] determinants [of effective
practice] and their optimal combinations," such as
''the treatment method, the individual psychologist, the treatment relationship, and the parienc"
(APA, 2006, p. 275). The report's endorsement
of these and other common factors shows chat
this APA policy is in line with the worldview of
che common-factors movement: responsibility for
change is not attributed to a specific treatment
alone, buc also to the therapist, the patient, and
their dynamic relationship.
Consistent wich the common-factors movement, the APA policy explicitly values che inclusion of a diversity of methods. By "starc[ing] with
the patient" (APA, 2006, p. 273), the APA policy
is thought to free itself from relying on a single
method's worldviews about the nature of illness and
effective treatment. This allows it to be informed
from a diversity of methods, including-bur not
limited co-ESTs (APA) and cheir respective
conceptions of evidence. This accommodation to
diversity is not surprising, considering APA's goal
for the policy co include a consideration of each
valid perspective in che discipline ("A presidential,"
2005).
In comparison to an EST framework, the
common-factors movement (including the APA
policy) is based on a wider conception of evidence
chat allows it to more objectively avoid bias and
better match the diverse needs of the discipline.
After a close evaluation, however, it is clear chat
the APA policy is also a biased framework and is

6
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not diverse enough for the wide range of practice
in psychology. Just as an EST framework uncritically restricts acceptable evidence to a single method
(RCT), so does the APA policy uncritically restrict
acceptable evidence to a single epistemology.
The epistemology on which the policy is based
is a narrow brand of empiricism 3. According to
this epistemology, "we can only know, or know
best, those aspects of our experience that are
sensory'' (Slife, 2006; see also Slife et al., 2005,
p. 84). Given popular demands chat natural science
disciplines be grounded in empiricism, the policy's
exclusion to empirical methods is understandable.
As I will show, however, this exclusion is not based
on evidence-analogous to a desire for RCTs, this
APA policy merely assumes that empiricism is the
only appropriate epistemology for evidence-based
practice, in spite of the existence of ocher promising epistemologies. This mistake is consistent with
much of psychology's history (Slife et al.), in which
empiricism has been misunderstood as meaning
objective or impartial, "in the sense of exposing
what is actual or real" (Slife et al.). In other words,
empiricism has not been seen as a particular epistemology or philosophy at all, but as a transparent
window to che way things are (Slife et al.).
The APA policy perpetuates an equation of
empiricism with reality, seeing no need co provide
a rationale for its repeated, implicit equation of
"evidence" with "empirically supported." The
report document (APA, 2006) claims, for example,
that "the purpose of EBPP is co promote effective
psychological practice ... by applying empirically
supported principles of psychological assessment,
3. This conception of empiricism is a fairly Lraditional one
and is che way the term is typically used in psychology. More
liberal usages of empiricism differ somewhat, such as William
James's radical empiricism, which encompasses "the whole
of experience," including non-sensory experiences such as
thoughts, emotions, and spiritual experiences (Slife, 2006).
In mainstream psychology, however, che term empiricism is
commonly used ro refer ro sensory experience only. Thus,
throughout chis paper, I will use empiricism co refer ro sensory
experience and non-empiricism co refer to non-sensory kinds
of experiences.
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case formulation, therapeutic relationship, and
intervention" (APA). Here, as in several other
places, che task force asserts that it endorses the
application of empirically supported principles, but
fails to explain why. In fact, nowhere in the policy
or in its underlying report is a rationale given for a
commitment to empirical research, and nowhere is
a consideration given for even the possibility of the
contribution of "non-empirical" research to EBPP.
If the task force does in fact view empiricism as a
particular epistemology, nowhere does it justify, or
even explicate, its exclusive commitment to ic.
This is a curious omission. If EBPP is exclusively committed to a single epistemology, why
not come right out and say it? Indeed, why not
call the movement empirically based practice in
psychology? Perhaps the task force wants to have
its cake and eat it too-to cater wholeheartedly and
uncritically ro one epistemology (empiricism) but
talk about it in a way that implies it does not see it
as an epistemology at all. This is similar ro an EST
framework and its equation of empirical support
as RCT-verified. The problem with both frameworks is their equation of a narrow conception of
evidence with a broader reality. An EST framework
is exclusively committed to RCTs but assumes that
such encompasses the broader field of empirical
support (hence the broad designation, empirically
supported treatments). Similarly, the APA policy is
exclusively committed to empiricism but assumes
chat such encompasses the broader field of evidential basis in psychology (hence the broad designation, evidence-based practice in psychology).
Thus, the problems with the APA policy's
commitment to empiricism are comparable to
those from an EST framework's commitment to the
RCT. In particular, the APA policy (a) demands,
without evidence, that clinical practice be shaped to
fie an empiricist epistemology and (b) marginalizes
the inclusion of non-empirical epistemologies and
their methods and practices, not because of their
potential fruitfulness for evidence-based practice,
but merely because they do not conform co the
logic and criteria of empiricism.
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Shaping Practice to Fit Empiricist Criteria
By assuming chat empiricism is the only
appropriate epistemology for evidence-based practice, the APA policy demands that clinical practice
be shaped to fir empirical criteria. However, just
as the majority of real-world patients cannot be
neacly categorized as a number of disorders, so
are the majority of real-world experiences not able
to be neatly categorized according to the logic of
empiricism. In fact, the vast majority of real-world
phenomena of interest for evidence-based practice
are not, strictly speaking, empirical in nature;
rather, they are unobservable experiences, meaning
they are not sensory in nacure (Slife et al., 2005).
Such phenomena include many, if not all, of the
common factors of therapeutic change, especially
chose concerning the therapeutic relationship (Slife
et al.).
Common-factors advocates and the APA cask
force have endorsed the investigation and implementation of such unobservable experiences for
evidence-based practice (APA, 2006), but only in a
way char is consistent with the logic of empiricism.
From an empiricist standpoint, che way to handle
an unobservable experience is co "operationalize"
it. An operationtdization is an observable, quantitative set of operations intended to represent an
unobservable construct. For example, one might
operationalize depression as a certain score on a
questionnaire, or intelligence as a score on an intelligence test. Although operationalization is widely
considered to be essential for the reliability and
progress of a scientific discipline, chis claim is not
at all based on empirical evidence. Indeed, there is
no empirical way of knowing whether, or in what
manner, an operationalization relates to the original, unobservable, construct of study.
The APA policy ignores chis problem, however,
assercing chat "good practice and science call for
the timely testing of psychological practices in a
way that adequately operationalizes them using
appropriate scientific methodology" (APA, 2006,
p. 274). No justification is given for chis claim-it
is merely assumed a priori. In this respect, the
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uncritical demand for operationalization is as problematic as the insistence chat ESTs work for comorbid patients. Likewise, it rests upon an assumption
that is as unfounded as the atomistic assumption of
comorbidity.
This assumption is the observability assumption
of unobservables (my cerm)- rhat unobservable
meanings and phenomena can in fact be operationalized into observable phenomena (Slife er al.,
2005). Like rhe atomistic assumption, the observability assumption is a preinvestigatory bias chat
does not sufficiently represent real-world phenomena. Similarly, there appears to be no justification
for it at all, apart from its conformity to the logic of
empiricism. Indeed, one cannot resort to empirical
evidence on chis matter, because it is not an empirical question- chis would be akin to justifying rhe
atomistic assumption with RCT evidence. If one
were to justify the observable assumption, it would
require theoretical expertise concerning the nature
of unobservable meanings- and just as the RCT
is not concerned with comorbid patients, so is
empiricism not concerned with unobservables.
If one assumes, for example, that an operationalization is connected or related in any way to an
unobservable meaning, this connection must itself
be a non-empirical, unobservable one. Suppose, for
example, a researcher seeks to study "happiness" (an
unobservable meaning) using a self-report questionnaire score (an operational definition). The
score would be, at best, an observable manifestation
of happiness, but even chis cannot be known from
an empiricist framework because the relationship
between the observable and the unobservable
is a non-empirical question (Slife et al., 2005).
Likewise, the insistence for operationalization is
a non-empirical claim; at best, it must rely on a
logical or theoretical argument that can never be
confirmed nor denied by empirical evidence alone.
How, then, would one evaluate whether an
unobservable meaning is connected t0 an observable
operationalization? Here we can rake cues from the
common-facrors movement's denunciation of rhe
atomistic assumption- we must appeal co a wider
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framework ofcvidence, one chat includes the study
of unobservable meanings. As I will demonstrate,
reputable methods-qualitative methods-exist
which intentionally avoid operationalization and
involve che scudy of unobservables. Thus, if unobservable meanings are in fact a subject of interest for
psychological practice, then the proper approach is
to turn to qualitative methods "rather than to cum
unobservable meanings into something they are
not" (Slife & Wende, 2005).
The APA policy's insistence for operationalization highlights just one way chat the commonfactors framework is driven by the constraints of
empiricism. It is discussed as an example here to
demonstrate how psychologists are interested in
non-empirical content, but are nonetheless restricted to an empiricist epistemology in method
(Slife et al., 2005). This restriction causes the
reshaping of unobservable phenomena to fit empiricist methodology, without considering whether
alternative method philosophies arc more appropriate-just as the conception of comorbidicy is
inappropriately reshaped by an EST framework.

Marginalization ofNon-empirical Philosophies
and Methods
Just as an EST framework ignores che fact that
certain conceptions of evidence are outside the
realm of RCTs, so does a common-factors empiricist framework ignore che fact, established earlier,
that unobservable phenomena are inherently-now
and forever-outside the realm of empirical methods. Like an EST framework, this mistake commits
a preinvestigarory bias against alternative conceptions of evidence.
For example, in its report's discussion of
appropriate methods for EBPP, chc APA task force
appears to ignore che existence and potential of
non-empirical methods. This can be seen in the cask
force's evaluation of qualitative methods. Although
commonly misunderstood as originating from an
empiricist methodology, qualitative methods are
based on an alternative philosophy of science that
neither requires nor prefers operationalization (Slife
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et al., 2005). Early qualitative researchers were
interested in unobservable phenomena themselves,
not their supposed manifestations. Therefore, they
have developed alternative, qualitative methods
that are better suited than empirical methods co
understand and investigate these meanings, including their connection to observable experiences
(Slife & Wende, 2005).
Although che cask force's report includes qualitative research on its list of acceptable methods, it
fails to understand and value qualitative research
as a non-empirical method. When one considers,
for example, the report's insistence for operationalization, it is puzzling to know how exactly
non-empirical qualitative methods would inform
evidence-based practice. The report is hardly informative on the matter, stating merely that "qualitative research can be used to describe the subjective,
lived experiences of people, including participants
in psychotherapy" (APA, 2006, p. 274). How
do descriptions of "subjective, lived experiences"
inform evidence-based practice? From the cask
force's report, the answer is unclear-one can only
surmise, given the policy's requirement of operationalization, chat qualitative research could lead to
the development of new or improved operationalizations that can then be isolated, investigated, and
implemented for evidence-based practice. Such a
view is driven by an empiricist epistemology, causing a distorted and marginalized conception of the
role of qualitative research.
Another clear signal that the task force misunderstands and misrepresents qualitative research-and that also indicates the APA policy's
empiricist framework- is the use of the word
subjective in describing the purpose of qualitative research. Of all the methods che cask force
recommends, the word subjective is reserved
only for qualitative research, implying char all
ocher recommended methods are "objective." In
che midst of a discipline chat champions objective inquiry, a relegation of being subjective is a
second-class citizenship at best (Slife, 2006). A
relegation of subjective, in chis case, makes sense
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only from an empiricist framework; from a nonempiricist framework, empiricist conceptions of
"objective" and "subjective" are largely irrelevant
(Slife, 2006). This is because an empiricist's definition of "objective" is generally synonymous with
"empirical." From a non-empirical perspective,
however, the subject matter of qualirative researchers is hardly subjective. The qualitative researcher
is not interested, for example, in investigating a
subjective interpretation of "love"; she is interested
in studying the objective, non-sensory experience
of love itself. Therefore, although the cask force
recommends the use of qualitative methods for
EBPP, it does so only in a way that is grounded
in empiricism, thereby distorting the nature and
history of qualitative research.
That the APA policy misunderstands and
misrepresents qualitative research calls into question whether it truly "acknowledge[s] the valid
points from all sides of the debate" ("A presidential," 2005, p. 59). Instead, the policy is committed to an empiricist epistemology char causes it co
have a preinvestigacory bias against non-empiricist
philosophies and the methods they imply. This bias
can lead co the misinterpretation and marginalization ofa given method-as is the case for qualitative
methods-or it can exclude the method altogether,
before investigation even begins.
In summary, the common-factors movement
and APA policy are driven by che epistemology
of empiricism, and this commitment is analogous
to an EST framework's commitment co RCTs.
Because the policy does not consider whether
an empiricist framework is consistent with the
nature of real-world patients and circumstances,
it reshapes, marginalizes, or ignores non-empirical
phenomena and methods in order to adhere co the
logic of empiricism.

A Broader Framework: Objective
Methodological Pluralism
Thus far, I have argued that neither the EST
movement nor the common-factors movement
has produced a framework chat matches the APA
cask force's ideals of objectivity and diversity. Such
ideals are prevented by the fact that each movement
constitutes a preinvestigatory bias against a broader,
and necessary, conception of evidence. Thus, the
discipline is still in need of a proper framework
for evidence-based practice-one that is broad
enough to include not only the investigation and
implementation of research methods and types of
practice, but also their underlying epistemologies.
Such is required to avoid the error of uncritically
limiting acceptable evidence to a preconceived
method or epistemology.
The remainder of this paper will discuss a
potentially successful framework, objective methodological pluralism (OMP). 4 As evidenced by its
name, OMP is concerned with being "objective,"
rather than with (subjectively) shaping the world
to fit the demands of a chosen method or methodology. It is important co understand, however,
that for OMP the meaning of objective is more
broadly understood than it is from an empiricist
framework. The objectivity of empiricism is often
simply equated with an adherence co empiricist
methodology, which is assumed-rather than
known- to be the objective "revealer of the actual
and the truthful, not the bearer of some ideological or economic methodology" (Slife et al., 2005,
p. 83). This conception of objectivity is inadequate,
as is evident when considering the limitations of
empiricism; indeed, empiricism itself is both an
ideological and economic methodology (Slife et al.).

4. Psychochcrapy researcher Rrem Slife (Slife et al. , 2005,
pp. 93-95; Slife, 2006; Slife & Wende, 2005) has arciculaced
OMP in more depch chan will be included in chis paper. Here
I wish to briefly discuss how OMP promises to be a genuinely
objective and diverse framework for evidence-based praccicc.
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In contrast to an empiricist framework, OMP's
objectivity is not due to an adherence to a single
methodology, but from irs aim to be guided by "rhe
truth of our practical experience" (Slife, 2006). In
ocher words, OMP seeks to be driven by the "object
of study" (Slife), not a preordained understanding
about how to best measure such (Slife er al., 2005).
Only by being object-driven,5 as opposed to
method- or methodology-driven, can a framework
for evidence-based practice best avoid an ideological or economic methodology.
To be object-driven, OMP requires one to first
consider the nature of the object of study, and then
utilize or invent the research method or type of
practice that is most compatible with the object's
nature (Slife et al, 2005). This would require determining, for example, whether the object of study is,
strictly speaking, a sensory observation (e.g., heart
rate, behavioral habits) or a non-sensory meaning
(e.g., empathy, therapeutic relationship; Slife, 2006).
If "the postulated characteristics of the object" (Slife
er al., p. 94) are knowable through sensory observation, then traditional empirical methods might be
the preferred route (Slife & Wendt, 2005). However,
for the study of unobservable meanings-which,
again, constiwte a vase portion of che phenomena
of interest for evidence-based practice-qualitative
methods would be more appropriate.
In examining the object of one's study, researchers and practitioners might ask the following types
of questions: What is the nature of the object? Is it
a phenomenon chat is knowable through empirical
observation alone? Or is it an unobservable meaning? If an unobservable meaning, does it also consist
of observable manifestations? If so, how are such
manifestations related to the unobservable meaning?
From an OMP perspective, such questions would be
5. One might prefer the term "subject-driven,"
'"phenomena-driven," "question-driven," "concept-driven,"
or "patient-driven" (Stephen Yanchar, personal communication, June 26, 2006). T here is no problem with these terms,
bur "object-driven" ($life's term) will he used throughout
chis paper to emphasize the objectivity of an object-driven
app roach.
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asked b~forecommitting to a preconceived method,
philosophy, or ideology.6 Such an approach differs
starkly from an EST or common-factors approach,
both of which depend on a commitment to a
preconceived method or epistemology. This dependency prohibits each framework from considering
epistemological, philosophical, or value questions
in the first place.
An example will illustrate how the OMP and
common-factors approaches might compare-and
how OMP best avoids being driven by a preconceived method or epistemology. Suppose chat a
researcher wishes to examine the role of a therapist's "empathy" in effective psychotherapy (a
proven factor of effective therapy, according to the
common-factors movement) (Bohart et al., 1998).
From the onset, che common-factors approach
is constrained co begin with an operational definition of empathy, according to "appropriate
scientific methodology" (APA, 2006, p. 274). To
establish an empirically demonstrable definition,
the researcher would determine certain variables
that are assumed-rather than known-to relate
to empathy and then determine their efficacy via
traditional experimental methods.
An OMP approach, in contrast, would first be
concerned with the nature of empathy, rather than
automatically adhering co the empirical method
and its requirement for operationalization. The
researcher might ask, "What am I really interested in?" In chis case, she might determine that
one cannot assume chat empathy is, at bottom, a
sensory observation. She might consider, of course,
constructing an empirical operationalization of

6. Of course, these types of questions should he considered
and reconsidered throughout the process of one's study. An
imporcam feature of OMP is its "active and ongoing dialogue
about che method values needed to illuminate the objects of
inquiry" (Slife et al., 2005, p. 94). In this respect, "various
informal investigations and methods could aid in making
these decisions, and some value systems even 'tried on' to see
how helpful they are" (p. 94). The bottom line is that such
value systems and methods "would themselves he conrinuously on trial" (p. 94) .
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empathy (e.g., vocal properties of therapists chat are
judged by their patients co have empathy). Bue she
decides against such, determining chat she is not
interested in manifestations and subjective reports
of empathy-she desires an objective study of empathy itself If her study is to include empirical, operational designs, then it must also include a rationale
for how such operations relate to empathy. Such
hypothetical relationships, che researcher decides,
are inherently unobservable; they lie beyond the
realm of empirical methods, because rhe object of
study icself--empachy-is an unobservable meaning, not an empirically demonstrable entity.
With chis realization, our hypothetical researcher can do no more if she is trained solely in
empirical methods-just as a nails-only carpenter
is at a loss when it comes to screws. With expertise
in qualitative methods, however, she might be able
to determine or create a method that is suitable for
examining unobservable meanings. Such a study
might include empirical factors, (e.g., practitioners'
vocal properties or patients' Likert-scale judgments)
but rhey would not be automatically equated with
empathy but seen as mere parts or manifestations
of-a larger, unobservable meaning. Thus, a qualitative approach would need to involve and examine
a theoretical connection between such empirical
manifestations and the unobservable meaning
of "empathy," as well as examine the relationship
between "empathy" and successful practice. This
would require, of course, an objective approach to
the study of "successful practice"-anocher unobservable meaning, and one chat is "rarely considered
in psychology" (Slife, 2006).7. Ir is fair co wonder, at this point, how exactly che srudy on
empathy would be conducted, and I confess that my description is limited in ics concreteness. fc is beyond chescope of chis
paper to articulate or create an in-depth example ofa parcicular
method for such. Instead, I have attempted co briefly discuss
che general principles thac might be incorporated in order co
maintain an object-driven enquiry. In keeping with che face
chat OMP requires an object-driven approach, I cannot even
artempc to provide a plausible example without conducting
an actual study. This may seem to he an enormous limitation,
but actually ic is consistent with che overriding claim of this

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/intuition/vol2/iss1/8

Now, it is important co note chat OMP does
not pretend to be free of assumptions or biases. Ac
bottom, OMP is a pragmatic framework, based on
a philosophy that "cakes its cues from the practical
context of research rather than the abstract propositions ofepistemology" (Slife et al., 2005, p. 94). This
type of pragmatism is grounded, in many respects,
to che tradition of William James (p. 94). I do nor
expect that OMP's underlying commitment co
pragmatism would worry many practitioners in the
discipline, especially considering, once again, that
the vast majority are at least somewhat pragmatically
eclectic or inregrationist (see above). Moreover,
OMP's pragmatism should not be terribly troubling
to both researchers and practitioners who value the
APA policy's requirement of adapting therapy to
the practical needs of clinical circumstances and
individual patients. Indeed, the APA policy itself is
also underlain in a commitment to pragmatismhow else can one understand its claim that EBPP,
unlike ESTs, "starts with the patient and asks what
research evidence ... will assist the psychologist in
achieving the best outcome"? (APA, 2006, p. 273).
The difference, however, bet\veen OMP and
EBPP is chat OMP is ultimately grounded in pragmatism, whereas EBPP is ultimately grounded in
empiricism. Therefore, when EBPP claims that it
"starts with che patient," what it really means is that
it starts with the patient in a way chat presupposes
the sufficiency of an empirical methodology. Thus,
its conception of the very meaning of "pacienc" and
what it means co "start with rhe patient" are already
grounded in an empiricist framework. Thus,
from the very beginning, unobservable meanings
of "scart[ing] with the patient," including the
methods and practices they might imply, are never
considered, in spice of the fact that an attention to
paper: ln order co he a truly objective and diverse discipline,
psychology cannot determine in advance a derailed method
or methodology; instead, its methods must merely be an
outgrowth of"the truth of our practical experience." Because
of chis, a description of OMP cannot provide derails for a
prescriptive methodology without falling imo the trap of
being led by a predetermined method or methodology.

12

et al.: Evidence-Based Practice Movements in Psychology: Empirically Supp

EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE

such meanings are a logical extension of "the rruch
of our practical experience" (Slife, 2006), as argued
previously.
UnlikeAPA's conception ofEBPP, OMP is open
co the entire range of real-world clinical phenomena, both sensory observarions and unobservable
meanings. This openness allows OMP to be a truly
diverse framework for evidence-based practice-it
is nor inherently biased against any method or epistemology that is useful for evidence-based practice.
Instead, OMP seeks only to be pragmatic, open to
whatever methods and epistemologies are a practical outgrowth of "the truth of our practical experience" (Slife, 2006).
Because the truth of the experience of realworld practice is concerned with unobservables,
it is rherefore necessary for OMP to be concerned
wirh unobservable methods, as well as the episcemologies chat guide those methods. This pragmatic
openness prevents OMP from being driven by a
restrictive epistemological or methodological ideology (Slife ct al., 2005). As a consequence, OMP
is a more diverse framework than an empiricist
common-factors conceprion of evidence.

Conclusion
When compared to an EST framework, the
common-factors movement and the APA policy
are a step forward for evidence-based practice
toward its ideals of objectivity and diversity. Upon
close evaluation, however, it is evident that the
APA policy makes similar mistakes. Both are based
on limited, biased conceptions of evidence thar
constitute a preinvesrigarory bias against alternative conceptions and the methods they imply. An
EST framework is built upon a medical-model
of evidence that is biased toward RCT-based
creacmencs for specific disorders, causing it to fail
co appreciate and consider alternative research
methods and types of practice that are built upon
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non-medical-model conceptions of evidence.
Analogously, the common-factors movement and
APA policy are built upon an empiricist model of
evidence that is biased toward sensory observable
criteria of evidence, causing them to fail to appreciate and consider non-empirical methods and
practices, such as qualitative research. Ultimately,
objective methodological pluralism (OMP) is a
more promising framework for marching rhe APA
task force's criteria of objectivity and diversity.
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